Archive Page 2

06
Sep
11

Is Mikhail Prokhorov Vladimir Putin’s secret candidate?

A fascinating analyzis on Russian politics and on the different scenarios which could occur during the 2012 presidential campaign.

Both Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitry Medvedev have repeatedly suggested that they may run in the 2012 presidential election.

But neither of them has announced an official bid, and they have put considerable effort into keeping everyone guessing. When questioned, Putin and Medvedev say they will consult with each other in order to decide who will seek the presidency.

But one thing is clear: Putin, Russia’s most powerful politician, will have the decisive say in determining who will serve as president for the next six years.

Once his choice is made sometime this year, the ruling elite will close ranks and support the chosen candidate. The outcome of his informal choice will most likely be formalized in the March election, thanks to Putin’s popularity, the enormous capabilities of the ruling elite to implement their preferences, and the questionable fairness of Russia’s recent elections.

Medvedev will most probably accept Putin’s choice, even if it entails his departure from the Kremlin and Putin’s return to the presidency.

If there is a deep crisis in 2011 that the ruling tandem cannot manage without risking their own political and business interests, they may have to back a third candidate.

Even without a serious crisis, Putin could back a third candidate if he loses confidence in Medvedev and simultaneously wishes to step aside himself because of fatigue.

There is also the possibility that disruptive events on the scale of the recent uprisings in the Arab world could erupt, leading to a change of power that neither Putin nor Medvedev would support. However, the probability of such a development is low.

That said, there are three likely scenarios for the election: Medvedev stays in power; Putin returns to power; or an as-yet unknown President X comes to power. These scenarios would have markedly different implications for domestic politics in Russia. However, a certain continuity across the scenarios can be assumed for the Kremlin’s foreign policy.

Key Uncertainties

Putin’s final decision on who will occupy the Kremlin for the next six years will be determined by key uncertainties that may take place over the next six months. Some of these uncertainties would lead to a serious change in the course of Russia’s development.

Here are the main uncertainties:

Will Putin feel that Medvedev can cope and protect his interests for six years? Putin may decide to remove Medvedev for several reasons. For instance, he may feel that there is a chance that Medvedev may lose his grip on power during his second term due to foreign or domestic challenges. Or he may feel that Medvedev will not guarantee the protection of his allies’ business interests during his second term. So far, Putin has not explicitly indicated publicly whether he will run, although there are signs that he would like to stay in power in some capacity beyond 2012.

Putin and the fatigue factor. Media reports and leaked U.S. diplomatic cables indicate that Putin’s appetite for work is flagging and he might be suffering from fatigue. If that is true, he may already be exploring ways to withdraw from the government for good. But such an exit would mean that Putin would no longer be able to take over from Medvedev if Medvedev loses control or fails to protect Putin’s interests during his second term. If wary of Medvedev’s capability to protect his interests, a tired Putin may then choose someone he regards as a more able and loyal candidate for the 2012 election or at least install Medvedev in the prime minister’s seat.

Will Medvedev feel it is time to rid himself of Putin’s patronage? Medvedev may decide that he has a better vision for Russia and more energy to promote the country’s development without Putin’s patronage. In that case he could take steps to increase his chances in negotiations with Putin on the 2012 election by shifting the balance between their bureaucratic power bases. For instance, Medvedev may use his constitutional powers to remove top officials and may start a broad campaign of replacing Putin’s appointees in key government positions with his own loyalists.

A major terrorist attack or meltdown in the North Caucasus. Terrorism in the North Caucasus appears to be manageable, with Islamist militants capable of only hit-and-run operations in the region and occasional terrorist attacks in the rest of Russia. Nonetheless, it is possible that terrorists may initiate action that will lead to a meltdown. Insurgent and terrorist groups may manage to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction in a major city or in a series of coordinated attacks, including seizures of towns and hostage-takings, and trigger a massive, indiscriminate government response. This would result in a long-term destabilization of the region, with the re-emergence of rebel-controlled pockets in far-flung corners of the North Caucasus and frequent attacks against government targets in urban areas.

An escalation of ethnic riots. There could be simultaneous riots in major cities similar to those staged by ultranationalists in Moscow in December 2010, but resulting in double-digit casualties and generating a violent response by natives of the North Caucasus. Under such circumstances the authorities would use force to disperse rioters, initiating massive arrests and taking a tougher stance against public activism in general. This would create a backlash in which ultranationalists would be in conflict with North Caucasus natives in major cities, and both sides would resist any attempt by the government to subdue riots.

A protracted deep economic crisis coupled with low oil prices. In the short term, Russia will to some extent be affected by external factors that it can neither forecast nor control, such as energy prices on world markets. The price of oil is the uncertainty that the government is least able to control and that will have the greatest impact on the country. The economy remains very dependent on exports of natural resources, with other sectors lagging behind global market leaders in productivity and efficiency.

A new, protracted global economic crisis may hit Russia hard, forcing the government to spend all its reserves. The sovereign Reserve Fund contained 775.2 billion rubles ($25.5 billion) as of Jan. 1, down 57.6 percent from 1.8 trillion rubles ($59.6 billion) on Jan. 1, 2010, as the government drew from reserves to cover the budget deficit. The 2011 federal budget was calculated on a premise that the average price of oil would be $75 per barrel, and each additional dollar per barrel is estimated to result in another $2.14 billion for the federal budget and vice versa. But if the price of oil falls  more than 50 percent and stays at that level due to a global crisis or other developments, the government will quickly deplete its reserves and be unable to honor its obligations to the population without raising taxes, which could cause protests.

An escalation of frozen conflicts in the former Soviet Union. This would have a profoundly destabilizing influence on Russia’s neighborhood. A renewed armed conflict with Georgia over South Ossetia and Abkhazia would spread violence and instability into the North Caucasus. The ultimate defeat of Russia’s foes in such a conflict could create a failed or failing state that would serve as a springboard for terrorist and insurgency networks.

A resumption and expansion of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict may also require Russia’s involvement since Russia has treaty obligations to come to Armenia’s defense in a conflict.

Depending on how all these uncertain structural indicators play out and how they interact with other factors, three possible scenarios emerge for the March election.

Scenario 1: Medvedev Stays in Power

Medvedev is likely to remain in power for a second term while Putin will either remain a power broker for the entire second term or perhaps gradually exit from politics if these key uncertainties play out in the following way over the next six months:

  • Putin feels Medvedev will cope and protect his interests in 2012-18.
  • Putin increasingly suffers from fatigue.
  • Medvedev does not feel it is time to shed Putin’s patronage.
  • None of the following occurs: a major terrorist attack or meltdown in the North Caucasus; an escalation of ethnic riots; a protracted deep economic crisis; or an escalation of frozen conflicts in the former Soviet Union.

Instability in North Africa and tensions over Iran’s nuclear program, coupled with the continuing recovery of the global economy, keep oil prices hovering at $100 per barrel or above over the next six months. As a result, Russia’s GDP continues to grow. Content with Medvedev’s peacetime performance, Putin agrees that his protégé run for a second term. Medvedev wins the March vote in the first round.

After the election, Medvedev pursues essentially the same domestic policies as he did during his first term but more decisively in the sphere of economic liberalization and reduction of opportunities for corruption. He is more cautious and incremental with reforms that affect the interests of elites or provide for political liberalization. Each serious reform in these spheres is preceded by a public discussion, both in online forums and among experts. More important, each reform is cleared with Putin, at least in the first year of Medvedev’s second term.

Government agencies continue to work to heed Medvedev’s directive to seek modernization alliances with Western countries. Russia accedes to the World Trade Organization, while the U.S. Congress repeals the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the 1974 Trade Act. Russia and the United States also reach a compromise on missile defense and agree to cooperate to keep Afghanistan stable as NATO draws down forces in this country.

At an EU-Russia summit in 2012, Brussels and Moscow agree on a deadline for introducing a visa-free regime and on the further investment of European companies in the upstream assets of Russia’s energy and high-technology sectors.

Russia advances its agenda through post-Soviet integration organizations while maintaining its grip on a smaller but still substantial part of the export routes, but it achieves no qualitative breakthroughs. The relationship with Belarus remains ambiguous, with no integration breakthroughs and occasional conflicts over the price of Russian energy supply and transit. Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh continue to remain de-facto independent, while Moldova’s conflict with Transdnestr progresses toward resolution thanks to the joint efforts in 2012 of Russia, Ukraine and powerful EU members such as Germany.

Russia continues to oppose “crippling sanctions” on Iran but prods Tehran to cooperate with the international monitors and allow more transparency regarding its nuclear program.

Scenario 2: Putin Returns to Power

The probability of Putin’s return to power will increase substantially if any of the following key events occur before Medvedev’s first term expires:

  • Putin comes to believe that Medvedev will fail to either cope with challenges or protect his interests in 2012-18.
  • A major terrorist attack or meltdown in the North Caucasus materializes.
  • Ethnic riots escalate.
  • Frozen conflicts in the former Soviet Union escalate.

Should any of these events — or a combination of them — occur this year or in the first weeks of 2012, Putin will replace Medvedev in the Kremlin to ensure political stability and solidify his own policies.

After waning during Medvedev’s term of office, the concept of sovereign democracy will stage a triumphant return as the core of Russia’s national ideology. For opposition groups, it means a further stifling of their legal activities as the government increases control over NGOs under the pretence of fighting terrorism and extremism. The State Duma passes a new set of laws further curtailing civil liberties and media freedoms.

The influence of the siloviki escalates, but Putin does not allow any particular group in the clan to dominate.

Trying to offset the impact that a more aggressive foreign policy might have had on international investors, Putin — understanding full well the need to diversify the economy — decides to liberalize foreign corporations’ access to the Russian market. The attempts by Russian companies to acquire downstream energy transportation infrastructure continue to meet the tacit but formidable resistance of most European governments.

The favorable conditions offered by the Russian government attract quite a few major international companies, from energy giants to retail firms. While state champions continue to dominate in the so-called strategic industries — such as Gazprom and Rosneft in the energy sector and Russian Technologies in the defense industry sector — private companies, both Russian and international, thrive in the retail, construction, agriculture, food, entertainment and automobile sectors.

A new war of words flares up between Moscow and Washington and Brussels over ballistic missile defense deployment in Europe. However, pragmatic approaches on both sides help  gradually relieve tensions as Washington and Moscow converge on the perception that their common immediate security threat is posed not by each other but by a new wave of militant Islamism, which galvanizes North Caucasus religious extremists and creates new risks for the United States and NATO personnel deployed abroad.

Russia increases its involvement in Belarus, progressing toward incorporating the country by solidifying its control over the economy of its neighbor. Belarussian President Alexander Lukashenko lacks alternatives due to his increasing isolation from the West.

Moscow also increases its presence in Central Asia as the growth of religious extremism there prompts regional leaders to seek a strong and unscrupulous ally in the fight against Muslim radicals. Although Chinese influence on the economy of these states increases, it is Russia that remains the center of gravity for the Central Asian republics. The strong authoritarian political model that is being rebuilt by Putin is increasingly appealing to the Central Asian leaders. Putin also continues to anchor these and other former Soviet republics to Moscow through integration projects such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Eurasian Economic Community and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Having cooled Russia’s engagement with the West, Putin pursues a closer alignment with China, further increasing energy exports to this country. Overall, however, Putin remains wary of China’s growing influence.

Cooperation with the West in curbing Iran’s nuclear ambitions stalls as Tehran awards and Moscow accepts new multibillion-dollar contracts to build nuclear power plants and deliver machinery.

Russia remains out of the WTO. Moscow preserves its membership of the Group of Eight industrial countries, although it may be left out of negotiations on some key decisions. Russia responds by accusing international organizations of attempting to undermine its sovereignty.

Scenario 3: President X

Putin is likely to facilitate the ascent of a third candidate if he feels that Medvedev is no longer willing or able to protect his interests in 2012-18, he suffers from fatigue, or a protracted economic crisis or ethnic riots occur.

A protracted global crisis erupts, spurred by a domino effect on the world economy — a combination of colossal earthquakes in Japan and California and the bankruptcy of several international investment powerhouses. Oil prices drop to $50 per barrel and remain at that level until at least early 2012.

In late fall 2011, Putin and Medvedev conclude that on the current trajectory the government will run out of cash reserves sometime in 2012, making public authorities unable to honor their social obligations. Both realize that this will give rise to protests that may undermine political stability and affect positions held by the ruling tandem and Putin’s business allies.

Putin sees no major problem in arranging his own election in 2012. But he does not want to bear responsibility for all the country’s pending troubles because this would bring an end to his prestige as the national leader and, consequently, to his status of powerbroker between the ruling clans.

To make things worse, North Caucasus-based groups stage simultaneous terrorist acts in Moscow and other major cities, killing dozens of people. Ultranationalists exploit these attacks, perhaps by rallying support for marches planned for the National Unity Day holiday on Nov. 4, 2011. Riots break out not only in Moscow, but also in St. Petersburg and other large cities. Ultranationalists attack dark-skinned natives of the North Caucasus and foreign countries.

After some serious reflection as well as pressure from Putin, Medvedev announces that he will not run for re-election in March. By then, Putin has already picked a candidate — 40-year old Colonel X, commander of a unit of the Interior Troops who has been decorated with a Hero of Russia medal for his distinguished combat service in the North Caucasus.

Shortly after United Russia’s victory in the December elections, Putin and Medvedev jointly announce that neither of them will run but will instead back X as their candidate in 2012. X is elected president in the first round in March. Medvedev quits politics, while Putin remains the prime minister and leader of United Russia.

President X, like Putin, believes in a strong central government, in the dominance of the executive branch of government and in other features of a managed democracy. He acts to increase the federal government’s control over civil society, the mass media and other non-state actors. Nationalism with strong ethnic overtones — disguised as patriotism — plays a central role in the state ideology and is used to win the support of nationalists as well as to mobilize and solidify society.

Faced with the budget crunch, in mid-2012 the new president announces a sharp increase in both real estate and income taxes.

He cuts education and health budgets while leaving pensions and other social benefit payments intact. The police crack down on those who attempt to protest against these measures. X’s general response is to stifle opposition and intimidate independent political and social entities in order to prevent them from organizing scattered public protests into a nationwide movement.

President X pursues projects that would help anchor post-Soviet states to Moscow. He treats Russia’s near neighborhood as a zone for zero-sum games with the West that Moscow must win to advance its interests, such as the formation of friendly regimes along its borders and control of energy export routes from the former Soviet area.

Russia supports independence for Abkhazia and South Ossetia but cooperates with the EU on the settlement of Moldova’s conflict with Transdnestr.

President X also pursues closer cooperation with other countries that oppose the spread of Western influence in the post-Soviet neighborhood, such as Iran and China, seeking direct investments from China and arms sales to both. At the same time Moscow remains wary about the rise of China.

The president also adopts a harder stance on such issues as U.S. and NATO plans to deploy missile defense elements in Eastern Europe and refuses to revive the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. As the United States and NATO move forward with plans for missile shield installations in Europe, the president orders deployment of medium-range missiles in the Kaliningrad exclave. In relations with individual Western countries, the president seeks closer ties with EU members rather than NATO or the United States. Russia sees the EU as a much more benign actor but continues to play individual members off against one another.

While lambasting the West in addresses to domestic audiences, President X avoids excessive confrontations. He is pragmatic: He realizes that the national interests of Russia and such major Western powers as the United States and the EU converge on a number of issues, including terrorism and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. He is also well aware that Russia could not afford a new Cold War. More important, X knows that Russia is facing a budget crunch and needs direct foreign investments and Western expertise in efficient production methods much more than it did when booming oil prices ensured a steady flow of revenues and low interest rates for borrowing cash abroad.

At the same time his willingness to cooperate with the West will remain inversely related to Russia’s recovery from the crisis.

Other Scenarios

The recent changes of regime in countries in North Africa and the popular uprisings in the Middle East have led to discussions about whether Russia could see a scenario in which protesters demanding social justice and political freedoms topple the regime.

Like many countries in North Africa, Russia has problems with political freedoms, corruption and vulnerability to consumer price shocks as well as formidable Internet access, which can facilitate the organization of protests.

But all this is unlikely to lead to a revolution in Russia.

In the Arab countries, Islam was the unifying ideology for many of the protesters. Russia’s Christian Orthodox Church, which is widely recognized as the legitimate authority on issues of religion, has long been aligned with the state authorities and will not support any political activism.

Popular unrest could succeed and spread to other parts of the country only if it is staged in Moscow. However, Moscow, unlike Cairo or Tunis, has an abundance of economic opportunities. The rate of unemployment is considerably below the national level.

Other social factors that facilitate revolt, such as a large number of young people and relative poverty, hardly apply to Moscow. The average age of Moscow residents is 40 — one of the highest of the Russian regions — and the average Moscow family owns property worth hundreds of thousands of dollars. Moscow also has one of the highest gross regional products per capita, about $30,000. In addition, Moscow’s law enforcement agencies have the resources to suppress any protests.

Still, should developments take this course, the situation would probably evolve along the lines of the third-candidate scenario, especially in the latter stages.

It is even less likely that Putin and Medvedev will run against each other in the 2012 election, even though Putin did declare in April that he could not rule out that both he and Medvedev would run for president. Putin’s statement appears to be another attempt by the prime minister to maintain a shroud of secrecy over which one of the ruling tandem might run rather than revealing a real intention.

For his part, Medvedev reiterated at a May news conference that he rules out a situation in which he would run against Putin. Medvedev realizes that he would most likely lose to Putin and that he could face a coup if he doesn’t concede defeat.

Such a scenario would also be damaging for their personal political images and, more important, for Russia’s whole power vertical system. It could lead to a schism within the Russian ruling elite and weaken the central government, which is dangerous for a country that emerged on the ruins of an empire only 20 years ago.

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28
Aug
11

Medvedev compares Arab spring to the fall of the Berlin wall

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on Thursday compared the likely consequences of the Arab Spring to those of the fall of the Berlin Wall as he underlined the necessity of timely reforms to avoid unrest.

Revolts in the Middle East and North Africa “are of a historic character and can pave the way for transformations similar to those taking place in Central Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall”, the Russian leader told foreign ambassadors in the Kremlin.

“Events in the Arab world once again proved … that socioeconomic reforms, reforms that would take into account the interests of the widest majority of the population, must be carried out in due time,” Medvedev added in remarks released by the Kremlin.

The fall of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989 symbolised a bloodless end to communism, a move regarded as having had a domino effect across the Soviet bloc, ending in the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Medvedev’s words came after leaders of the Group of Eight countries at their France meeting in May adopted a declaration on the Arab Spring which also drew parallels with the 1989 removal of the 43-kilometre (27-mile) demarcation line between East and West Berlin.

Medvedev has previously called the uprising in Tunisia a “lesson” to all governments that do not meet the aspirations of the people.

However Russia has been a dissenting voice in the West’s treatment of the Libyan conflict, having abstained from a critical UN Security Council resolution and later continuing to criticise the scale of the NATO-led campaign.

16
Aug
11

Russia: Vladimir Putin launches his presidential campaign

In what could be seen as the start of a presidential campaign, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin reflected Friday on decisions he made that he said could have cost him his political career – and declared that the risk was always justified.

He specifically referred to his response to the 1999 rebel attacks on Dagestan led by the notorious Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev.

Militants headed by Basayev and Saudi-born Ibn Al-Khattab attacked Dagestan in August-September 1999. Hundreds of people were killed in the subsequent fighting, a precursor to the second Chechen war.

“Unless I took resolute and tough action, the country would have fallen apart,” he said during a working visit to one of Russia’s biggest steel makers, the Magnitogorsk Steel Plant.

“I had to make a decision. I thought: That’s it, my career is over.”

Putin said he acted in accordance with the country’s national interests, with no consideration of political expediency.

Asked what he considered his most significant achievement in the past decade, Putin said a good deal had been done for the country but Russia had still a long way to go, specifically reduce poverty and ensure economic growth.

“New tools, new people and new ideas are needed, deep modernization and innovation are needed to accelerate economic and social growth and strengthen the political foundations of our society,” Putin said.

Asked what quality was most important in a president, Putin said, “integrity – integrity in everything,” adding that a person who “can’t keep his word must not even be allowed to head any team, let alone the country.”

The prime minister also stressed the importance of professionalism and diplomacy.

Putin’s comments come as analysts and ordinary Russians speculate who will run in next year’s presidential poll.

President Dmitry Medvedev and Putin have made clear that one of them – and only one of them – will run in the presidential elections on March 11, 2012, but it is anyone’s guess as to which one.

03
Aug
11

Will Prokhorov really enter Russian politics?

What is doing Mikhail Prokhorov? The Russian tycoon who recently announced his intention to start a political career is playing a confusing game. Will he really defy Prime minister Vladimir Putin or is it just a tactical and symbolic move?

Russian tycoon Mikhail Prokhorov, who leads a small party praised by President Dmitry Medvedev, ridiculed Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s new political movement on Tuesday and said he would one day like the premier’s job.

Prokhorov, who made a fortune by gaining control of the world’s biggest palladium producer after the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union, last month took charge of a party which has called for Medvedev to run for re-election in the 2012 presidential election.

Putin and Medvedev have both repeatedly refused to say which of them will run in the March presidential election, though Putin created a new movement in May to widen the support of his ruling party ahead of a December parliamentary election.

The 46-year-old owner of the New Jersey Nets basketball club told the Kommersant newspaper that he agreed with Putin on some issues but not others, citing the centralized political system crafted by Putin during his 2000-2008 presidency.

The billionaire also mocked the swift rise in membership of Putin’s movement, the All-Russian People’s Front.

“You know, in my opinion, it is really laughable when 38 million agricultural workers join the Front in a single day,” Prokhorov told the paper, referring to a decision last month by Russia’s Agrarian Movement to join Putin’s movement.

While steering clear of direct criticism of Putin, he said the United Russia party which Putin leads was an ineffective monopoly. He said he hoped one day to be prime minister.

“Do you think I entered politics just to get into the Duma and then to relax and have a smoke?” said Prokhorov, adding that his free-market Right Cause party aimed to get 15 percent in the elections to the lower house of parliament, known as the Duma.

When asked why he wanted to become prime minister, the job Putin took in May 2008 when he stepped down as president after steering Medvedev in to the Kremlin, Prokhorov said:

“Because this job is clearer to me: it is connected with the things I have had to deal with in business. I have dealt with all sectors of the economy,” Prokhorov said.

OLIGARCH POLITICIAN

Prokhorov, the most influential Russian billionaire to enter public politics since the 2003 arrest of oil tycoon Mikhail Khodorkovsky, said he did not know what Putin would think of his ambition.

“I don’t know. I think it would be better if you asked him,” said Prokhorov, who is ranked by Finans magazine as Russia’s second richest man with a fortune of $22.7 billion, behind steel magnate Vladimir Lisin with $28.3 billion.

Such a response is unusually blunt given the power of Putin, Russia’s paramount leader, who made clear during his presidency his view that the deeply unpopular oligarchs should stay out of politics.

Khodorkovsky’s business empire was carved up and sold after he fell foul of the Kremlin under Putin. He is still in jail.

But few investors and diplomats believe such a powerful tycoon as Prokhorov would have entered politics without the direct approval — or even a direct order — from Medvedev’s Kremlin.

His outspoken entry into politics may even help create the perception of competition in the election year while garnering support from notoriously cynical urban professional voters.

Right Cause called in November 2010 — before Prokhorov’s election as leader — for Medvedev to run for a second term in the 2012 election and last month the Kremlin chief praised Prokhorov, saying many of his ideas were similar to his own.

A whiz-kid of Russian finance who is sometimes called Moscow’s most eligible bachelor, he earned a fortune by selling a one-quarter stake in mining behemoth Norilsk Nickel just before the 2008 global crisis hammered Russia’s economy.

He has a 17 percent stake in RUSAL, the world’s top aluminum producer, and a 30 percent stake in Russia’s top gold producer, Polyus Gold.

Prokhorov quipped that with his wealth, he could even top the campaign financing for Putin’s party: “If not for restrictions on party funding, I would beat United Russia with one single payment.”

24
Jul
11

Russian blogger gets political asylum in Estonia

Russian musician and blogger Savva Terentyev, convicted in 2008 of inciting hatred against police, was granted political asylum by Estonian immigration authorities on July 11.

The decision by the Police and Border Guard will allow Terentyev, his wife and his son, who have been living in Estonia since January, to remain in the country for three years.

In July 2008, a court in Terentyev’s native Syktyvkar in Russia’s Komi district found him guilty of “inciting enmity and publicly humiliating representatives of a social group,” and sentenced him to a one-year suspended jail sentence.

The year prior, then 21-year-old Terentyev posted a comment on an acquaintance’s Live Journal blog in response to a report on the blog of a police raid on a local opposition newspaper. Terentyev was highly critical of the police, calling for daily ceremonies in the center of every Russian city where one dishonest cop would be burned.

The case against him began six months later.

Terentyev’s conviction sent shockwaves through the Russian internet community as it was the country’s first criminal case based on a blog comment. The case has also been cited by international rights groups such as Reporters Without Borders, Freedom House and Human Rights Watch, whose reports Terentyev submitted along with his application for asylum, according to the BBC’s Russian service.

In an interview with the BBC, Terentyev said he has had difficulty finding work since his conviction due to the bad reputation he received, and has no plans to go back to Russia in the future. “All this ended with my receiving the right to live in Europe and now I can freely travel in the territory of the CIS as well as the EU,” he said.

Though he still believes he did not break the law in making his comments, Terentyev expressed regrets for making them. “I didn’t recognize, and I still do not recognize, that it was a violation of the law,” he said. “But now I wouldn’t write that, simply because I have a different mood than I had four years ago. I already admitted in court that it was pure stupidity. But for a personal correspondence between two young people it was perfectly normal.”

13
Jul
11

In 2012, an election and a good shower for Putin

The 2012 presidential will be dirty… literally dirty, warned Prime Minister Vladimir Putin whose plans for 2012 are “an election and a shower”. A new hint that the Russian strongman will be seeking for presidency next March.

Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin warned on Thursday that the March 2012 presidential election campaign would be dirty, but stopped short of saying whether he would seek another stint as Kremlin chief.

Putin, Russia’s most popular politician, made clear he would play a significant role in the election but told supporters he would need to cleanse politics after the campaign.

“I shall go to wash, in the hygienic sense of the word but also in the political sense,” Putin said, when asked at a regional conference of his ruling United Russia party what he would do the day after the March presidential election.

“After all the campaigns which we shall have to endure, you have to be properly hygienic. Unfortunately, this is an inevitable process,” he said.

“As Churchill said: Democracy is the worst form of government but there is no better one,” Putin said in the Urals city of Yekaterinburg.

Putin and his protege, President Dmitry Medvedev, have both repeatedly refused to say which of them will run in the March 2012 presidential election, which follows a parliamentary election in December.

06
Jul
11

Yulia Tymoshenko: an iron woman in trouble

Things ain’t getting better for Batkivshchyna Party leader Yulia Tymoshenko who is facing a trial in Ukrain. The former prime minister has said she plans to ask the court for a one month extension so that defense lawyer Mykola Tytarenko can review the materials of the criminal case against her.

“Everyone understands that if a defense lawyer is given one day to read 4,000 pages, that this is a dishonest and unfair trial. Today we will insist that my lawyer be given the opportunity, as provided by law, a month to familiarize himself with this criminal case,” Yulia Tymoshenko said before the start of today’s court session, reads Tymoshenko’s website.

Yulia Tymoshenko said that this time is needed to prepare their line of defense.

“Of course there was no crime, but we have to be ready to defend ourselves against the regime and the system of political repression,” she added.

Ukrainian security service says it has opened a criminal investigation into the activities of an energy company once headed by Tymoshenko.

The new probe focuses on whether former Cabinet officials and employees of United Energy Systems of Ukraine, a firm managed by Tymoshenko in the mid 1990s, embezzled $405 million.
Tymoshenko has been charged with abuse of office in signing a deal with Moscow to buy Russian natural gas at prices investigators said were too high.

She denies the charges, and describes them as a political plot by her rival, President Viktor Yanukovych, to keep her out of upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections.

The United States and the European Union have condemned the cases against Tymoshenko and a number of her top allies as selective prosecution of political opponents.